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Case No. 20060048-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals5 ruling in State v. 
Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, 127 P.3d 1265 (addendum A). It has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is defendant's state constitutional claim, which was not preserved in the 
trial court, presented to the court of appeals, included in the petition for certiorari, or 
adequately briefed on certiorari, properly before this Court? 
This Court is "resolute in [its] refusal to take up constitutional issues which have 
not been properly preserved, framed and briefed." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f^ 
14, 122 P.3d 506 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)), rev'don other grounds, No. 05-502 (U.S. May 22, 
2006) available at http://wwrw.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-502.pdf. 
2. Under the Fourth Amendment, does an off-duty officer exceed the 
permissible scope of an investigatory detention by transporting a driver he suspects to be 
intoxicated a short distance from an uninhabited area to meet an on-duty officer for 
further investigation? 
"On certiorari, [this Court will] review the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision 
under the appropriate standard of review." State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^  12, 131 P.2d 202 
(quoting Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, \ 8, 116 P.3d 290). Factual findings underlying 
the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law based on those findings are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, f 8, 111 P.3d 808. 
Application of law to underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases receives 
"non-deferential review." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information dated 29 September 2003 with driving 
under the influence of alcohol with two prior convictions, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004). R. 1-2. After being bound over at a 
preliminary hearing, defendant pled not guilty. R. 19-20. Defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence on the ground that he was unconstitutionally stopped and detained. R. 
24-35. Following an evidentiary hearing and briefing, defendant's motion was denied in 
a four-page memorandum decision. R. 36, 60-64, 92 (addendum B). Defendant entered a 
conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to a fine and a term of zero to five years, all but 
180 days of which was suspended. R. 75-79. Defendant timely appealed. R. 81. 
The court of appeals affirmed with one judge dissenting. State v. Worwood, 2005 
UT App 539, 127 P.3d 1265 (addendum A). This Court granted certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Driving down Deep Canyon in Juab County, Cory Wright and his friend, Skyler 
Fautin, observed a large wet spot in the dirt road. R. 92: 5.1 Nearby, a man stood by a 
truck parked diagonally in the middle of the road, blocking the way. R. 92: 5. Cory and 
Skyler had been horseback riding up the canyon and were pulling a horse trailer with 
Cory's truck. R. 92: 4. When Cory saw the wet spot and a crushed beer can on the road, 
1
 The transcript of the suppression hearing is attached as addendum C. 
3 
his "job kicked in" and he thought, "maybe this guy has been drinking." R. 92: 6-7. Cory 
was an off-duty highway patrol trooper. R. 92: 4. 
When defendant saw the truck and trailer approaching, he got into the truck and 
pulled off to the side of the road to let it pass. R. 92: 5-6. Instead of passing, Cory 
pulled up beside defendant, rolled down his window, and asked if everything was okay. 
R. 92: 6-7. Defendant said "Yeah" and stated that he had just stopped to urinate. R. 92: 
6-7. However, Cory did not believe that one person could make the spot. R. 92: 6. He 
suspected that the spot was made by pouring water from a cooler. R. 92: 6. He also 
noted that defendant's speech was "slow and slurred." R. 92: 8. Even from the driver's 
side of his truck, he could see that defendant's eyes were bloodshot. Id. He thought, 
"this guy[c]s got some alcohol in him"; in fact, he concluded that defendant was "very 
intoxicated." R. 92: 8, 13. 
Cory got out of his truck and walked around to defendant's pickup, where he 
smelled alcohol. R. 92: 8-9; R. 91: 4; R. 60, 62.2 Cory told defendant, "You know, we'H 
2
 The Brief of Petitioner states that "Wright did not smell the odor of alcohol at this 
time . . ." Br. Pet. at 4. However, the trial court found to the contrary: "Trooper Wright 
stopped to talk to the man, who was later identified as Mitchell Worwood. While talking to 
Mr. Worwood, Trooper Wright noticed Mr. Worwood had blood shot eyes and slurred 
speech. After talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer proximity, Trooper Wright also smelled 
the odor of alcohol." R. 60. This finding was a reasonable inference from ambiguous 
testimony. See R. 92: 8-9, 13-14; see also R. 91: 6. 
In the court of appeals, defendant did not contend that this finding was clearly 
erroneous; did not "marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding," rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; and did not "ferret out [any] fatal flaw in the 
evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. CQ&IS P.2d 1311,1315 (UtahCt. App. 1991). 
4 
better have a trooper look at you before you drive anymore." R. 92: 8. At that point Cory 
considered defendant "detained." R. 92: 15. He asked defendant for his driver's license, 
saw his name, and had him get out of the pickup. R. 92: 9-10. Although Cory did not 
know defendant, defendant knew that Cory was a peace officer. R. 92: 15. 
Without a cell phone or other means of contacting law enforcement, Cory decided 
to transport defendant down to Cory's own house, a "safer location" for the field sobriety 
tests. R. 91: 5, R. 92: 10, 11. In addition, he was off duty and "it would have messed up 
[his] night" to perform the tests and the likely arrest R. 92:11. Though officers 
commonly perform field sobriety tests at roadside, they do so with a patrol car; Cory was 
driving a truck and pulling a horse trailer. R. 91: 15; R. 92: 6, 9. 
Cory picked up the beer can, found it three-quarters empty, poured out the 
remaining beer, and tossed it into the back of defendant's pickup. R. 92: 10-12. He had 
defendant get into his truck and drove about a mile and a half to his own house, which is 
His Brief of Appellant simply ignored the finding and recited the facts in the light least 
favorable to the trial court's ruling. See Br. Aplt. at 3, 8. Accordingly, the court of appeals 
ruled that defendant "fail[ed] to challenge the trial court's finding that Trooper Wright 
smelled the odor of alcohol on Worwood's breath c[a]fter talking with Mr. Worwood at a 
closer proximity' but before asking him to ride with him in the truck." Worwood, 2005 UT 
App539,f3,n. l . 
Having failed to challenge the trial court's finding on appeal, defendant is bound by 
it. See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 60, 28 P.3d 1278 (noting that a party who wishes 
to challenge a factual finding must first marshal the evidence in support of the finding and 
then show why the marshaled evidence fails to support the finding). 
5 
at the base of Deep Canyon in the town of Levan. R. 92: 10. While en route Cory again 
smelled alcohol on defendant. R. 92: 9. 
Meanwhile, Skyler drove defendant's vehicle down the canyon, called the Juab 
County Sheriffs Department, and drove to Cory's house. R. 92: 10. Trooper Kevin 
Wright, Cory's brother, responded to the call. R. 92: 10; R. 91: 4, 14. All four men 
assembled at Cory's house outside Levan. R. 92: 10, 91: 12. 
Trooper Kevin Wright immediately smelled the alcohol on defendant's breath. R. 
91:6. He also observed that defendant's speech was slurred, that he swayed when he 
walked, and that his eyes were bloodshot. R. 91: 6-7. Trooper Kevin Wright performed 
the standard field sobriety tests. R. 91: 7; R. 92: 10. All indicated defendant was 
intoxicated. R. 91: 8-11. Trooper Kevin Wright arrested defendant, took him to the 
Sheriffs office, and administered a breath test. R. 91: 11, 12. The test result was .248 
liters percent. R. 91: 13.3 
With defendant's consent, Cory drove defendant's truck to defendant's house, 
giving the keys to his mother. R. 92: 11; R. 91: 12. Cory did this rather than impounding 
and inventorying it "because he was pretty decent when speaking with me" and "out of 
courtesy for someone that lives in the same community as I do." R. 92: 13. 
Defendant had two prior DUI convictions. R. 91: 24. 
3
 Presumably by this Officer Kevin Wright meant a blood alcohol level of .248 percent 
"per 210 liters of breath." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(c) (West 2004). 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant's state constitutional claim is not properly before this Court, for 
four reasons. First, it was not preserved in the trial court. Second, it was not presented to 
the court of appeals. Third, it was not included in the petition for certiorari. Finally, it is 
not adequately briefed. A state constitutional claim may not be treated as an afterthought. 
It requires separate analysis, including an examination of historical and textual evidence, 
sister state law, and policy arguments. None of this happened here. 
2. Defendant's detention did not escalate to a de facto arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment. After observing defendant at close range, the off-duty trooper reasonably 
concluded that defendant was intoxicated and required sobriety testing. The canyon 
roadside was an unsuitable location, neither safe nor conducive to accurate testing. In 
addition, the trooper was ill-prepared to effect an arrest. He was off-duty, pulling a horse 
trailer, and accompanied by a "kid" with whom he had been horseback riding. He acted 
reasonably in transferring defendant a mile and a half down the canyon to an on-duty 
officer in a safe location. His subjective motives are irrelevant to the analysis. 
Even if defendant's detention was a de facto arrest and that arrest was illegal for 
lack of probable cause, defendant is nevertheless not entitled to reversal. He has not 
demonstrated a causal link between the purportedly illegal arrest and the results of the 
field sobriety and other tests. Those test results were the fruit, not of the detention, but of 




DEFENDANT'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM, WHICH WAS 
NOT PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT, NOT PRESENTED TO 
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NOT INCLUDED IN THE PETITION 
FOR CERTIORARI, AND NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED, IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT 
Defendant claims that "the officer's conduct was a de facto arrest and violated 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Br. Pet. at 6. He claims to have advanced 
this claim in the court of appeals. Id. 
This Court is "resolute in [its] refusal to take up constitutional issues which have 
not been properly preserved, framed and briefed." Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, Tf 
13, 122 P.3d 506 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)), reversed on other grounds, Brigham City v. Stuart, 
No. 05-502, Slip op. at 5, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/ 
05pdf705-502.pdf. Where a party fails to properly preserve, frame, and brief an issue of 
state constitutional law, this Court is "foreclosed from undertaking a principled 
exploration of the interplay between federal and state protections of individual rights . . ." 
Id. at \ 14. 
Defendant's state constitutional claim was not preserved in the trial court, not 
presented to the court of appeals, not included in the petition for certiorari, and not 
adequately briefed. It is accordingly not properly before this Court. 
8 
A. Defendant's state constitutional claim is unpreserved. 
Defendant's state constitutional claim was not preserved at any level. 
1. This claim was not presented to the trial court. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal.55 State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, | 33, 122 P.3d 543 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74,1f 11, 10 P.3d 346). "A party cannot circumvent that rule by 'mere[ly] 
mentioning] . . . an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority'; such a cmere mention' cdoes not preserve that issue for appeal.'" 7#. (quoting 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). "Moreover, the proper forum in 
which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation 
is before the trial court, not, as typically happens and as happened here, for the first time 
on appeal." State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. 
Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
Defendant failed to preserve a state constitutional claim in the trial court. In a 
motion, two supporting memoranda, and an evidentiary hearing, defendant mentioned the 
Utah Constitution twice, both times in tandem with the Fourth Amendment. His principal 
memorandum referred perfunctorily to "the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution" and to "[t]he United States Constitution and the Constitution of 
Utah," but attempted no separate analysis and never suggested that the two constitutional 
protections were anything but coextensive. R. 28 (capitalization omitted), 30. Defendant 
9 
made no reference to the Utah Constitution in his reply memorandum or the suppression 
hearing. See R. 92, 46-57. The trial court's ruling refers to rights "guaranteed under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution," then proceeds to analyze the issue under the Fourth Amendment 
only. R. 61-64. 
In short, no state constitutional issue was "properly preserved" in the trial court. 
Stuart, 2005 UT 13, % 13. 
2. This claim was not presented to the court of appeals. 
"Issues not raised in the court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the 
issue arose for the first time out of the court of appeals' opinion." DeBry v. Noble, 889 
P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (quoted in Collins v. Sandy City Bd of Adjustment, 2002 UT 
77,^|19,n.3, 52P.3dl267). 
Defendant did not raise a state constitutional claim in the court of appeals. 
Defendant now contends that he "argued below that the officer's conduct violated both 
the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Br. Pet. at 6. 
Defendant's description of his court of appeals brief is inaccurate. Although defendant 
cites to pages five through ten of his brief in the court of appeals, id., in fact his 12-page 
brief refers to the Utah Constitution only once, on page five: "Because warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable, it is the State's significant burden to show that a 
warrantless search and seizure are [sic] lawful under both the Fourth Amendment to the 
10 
United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Br. Aplt. at 
5. The brief states two claims of error, both premised on the Fourth Amendment. Here is 
the first: 'The trial court's conclusion that the seizure of Worwood and his vehicle was 
only a level 2 encounter and therefore not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is 
incorrect." Br. Aplt. at i (capitalization omitted). Here is the second: "The detention of 
Worwood was unlawful and a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
The brief in fact places no reliance on the Utah Constitution. It does not quote or 
refer to the text of article I, section 14, cite any authorities interpreting it, offer any reason 
to read it differently from the Fourth Amendment, or even assert that it should be read 
differently. In sum, defendant did not "argue[] below that the officer's conduct violated 
both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Br. Pet. at 
6. Instead, he "relied nominally on state constitutional provisions while actually relying 
on the parallel federal constitutional provisions and analysis based on them." State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988), aff'd, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989) (refusing 
to analyze state constitutional issue), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lafferty v. Cook, 
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Moreover, no issue of state constitutional law "arose for the first time out of the 
court of appeals' opinion." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 444. Both the majority and the dissent 
understood defendant's claim to rely solely on the Fourth Amendment. The majority 
opinion thus reviewed the officer's conduct "under the Fourth Amendment," Worwood, 
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2005 UT 539, f^ 6, while the dissent concluded that the officer's actions "violated the 
Fourth Amendment." Id. at f^ 13 (Thome, J., dissenting); see also id. at \ 18 n.5 (Thome, 
J., dissenting). Neither opinion refers to the Utah Constitution. Yet defendant now faults 
the court of appeals for "directly undermining] the protections provided by article I, 
section 1 [4]." Br. Pet. at 11. 
No state constitutional issue was "properly preserved" or otherwise arose in the 
court of appeals. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, \ 14. 
3. This claim was not presented in the petition for certiorari. 
"Issues not presented in the petition for certiorari, or if presented, not included in 
the order granting certiorari or fairly encompassed within such issues, are not properly 
before this Court on the merits." DeBry,. 889 P.2d at 443; see also Utah R. App. P. 
49(a)(4). 
Defendant did not preserve a state constitutional issue in his petition for writ of 
certiorari. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari asserted one point: 
The court of appeals erred as a matter of law in creating a personal 
convenience exception to the Fourth Amendment, and by holding that the 
permissible scope of detention was not exceeded on these facts. 
Pet. at 7 (capitalization omitted). The petition contains no separate argument or analysis 
based on the state constitution. It refers only to "both the Utah and federal constitutions." 
Id. It refers 12 times to the Fourth Amendment and concludes by stating that "this Court 
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should hold that because Worwood's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, his motion 
to suppress evidence should be granted and his conviction vacated." Pet. at 12-13. 
Defendant's state constitutional claim is an afterthought. He did not preserve it in 
the trial court, present it to the court of appeals, or include it in his petition for certiorari. 
No thoughtful and probing analysis of this claim has been undertaken at any level, 
because defendant has sought none. 
B. Defendant's state constitutional claim is inadequately briefed. 
An adequately briefed argument "contain[s] the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). An adequate brief provides "meaningful 
legal analysis," State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 7, 1 P.3d 1108, and "fully identifies and 
analyzes the issues with citation to relevant legal authority." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 
22, 128 P.3d 1179 (citing State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, \ 11, 108 P.3d 710). "This analysis 
'requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority.'" City of West Jordan v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ^ f 29, 
550 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT \,\ 31, 973 P.2d 404). 
An appellant may "claim[] the trial court violated his rights under both the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution," but this Court will "decline to address his 
claims under the Utah Constitution [if] he has failed to separately brief his state claims." 
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State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 32 n.8, 55 P.3d 573. Thus, "[a]s a general rule, [this 
Court] will not engage in [a] state constitutional analysis unless an argument for different 
analyses under the state and federal constitution is briefed." State v. Harris, 2004 UT 
103, If 23, 104 P.3d 1250 (quoting Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1248 n. 5). This rule applies "in 
cases where a party 'reliefs] nominally on state constitutional provisions while actually 
relying on the parallel federal constitutional provisions and analysis based on them.5"/J. 
(quoting Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247, n.5). Cf. Harris, 2004 UT 104, Tf 23 (applying state 
constitution where appellant "relies almost exclusively on state authority that interprets 
and applies our state constitutional double jeopardy protection" where state provisions 
"are different from and provide greater protection than those afforded by the United 
States Constitution"). In short, this Court will not address a state constitutional issue 
merely because a party "claims a violation of both the state and federal constitutions"; it 
will "decline to address [the] state constitutional claim" where the claimant "has not 
briefed that claim cas an issue separate and distinct from its federal counterpart.'" Utah 
County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33, | 21 (quoting State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, \ 12, 125 P.3d 
938). 
To adequately brief a state constitutional issue, a litigant should begin with the 
text, then examine the history of the provision, compare it to similar provisions in sibling 
states, and explore relevant policy ramifications. This Court has "encouraged parties 
briefing state constitutional issues to use historical and textual evidence, sister state law, 
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and policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to assist us in 
arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in question." Society of Separationists 
v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). "Each of these 
types of evidence can help in divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical 
aspect of any constitutional interpretation." Id. (citations omitted). See, e.g., State v. 
Holm, 2006 UT 31, ^ 34-48 (majority opinion), ffif 117-26 (Nehring, J., concurring), ffif 
149-79 (Durham, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (examining text, history, and context of 
state constitutional provisions, as well as federal and sibling state counterparts); West v. 
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1012-1018 (Utah 1994) (same). 
Defendant's argument attempts none of this. It does not examine the text or even 
quote it. It ignores the history of the provision, attempts no comparison to federal or 
sibling state counterparts, and weighs no policy considerations. Its discussion of article I, 
section 14 is limited to truisms to the effect that the state constitution may provide greater 
protections than the Fourth Amendment. See Br. Pet. at 7. In short, defendant "has failed 
to separately brief his state claims." Calliham, 2002 UT 86, at \ 32 n.8. 
Instead, he has "relied nominally on state constitutional provisions while actually 
relying on the parallel federal constitutional provisions . . . " Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1248, 
n. 5. Thus, he contends that "the warrantless seizure of Worwood was a de facto arrest 
not supported by probable cause, and in violation of both article I, section 14, and the 
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 9. In support of this last statement, the brief cites four Utah 
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cases, all of which apply the Fourth Amendment, and none of which mention the Utah 
Constitution. See id. at 9, n.6; State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 f 28, 63 P.3d 650 ("The 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable seizures."); 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (analyzing search issue 
based on acts "the United States Supreme Court has held are constitutionally 
permissible"); State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ^ 10, 107 P.3d 706 ("The only issue 
before the court is whether Randall's detention of Chism . . . violated the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution."); Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 
\ 8, 998 P.2d 274 ("On appeal, Ray argues the trial court erred . . . in concluding that she 
was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment"). 
In the same vein, defendant cites State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 470 (1990) (per 
Durham, J., with one justice concurring and one justice concurring in result), for the 
proposition that "this Court has formally taken the position that 'warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before a 
warrant can be obtained.'" Br. Pet. at 8. However, read in context, this statement by the 
Larocco plurality emphasizes the convergence, not the divergence, of state and federal 
search and seizure guarantees: 
In fact, this court has consistently agreed with the view taken by the United 
States Supreme Court in Katz, as well as in Robbins, that "[warrantless 
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent circumstances 
require action before a warrant can be obtained." 
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Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (quoting State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984)). 
Of this excerpt, defendant quotes only the line from Christens en. Christens en in turn 
relies on two United States Supreme Court cases, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), and Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), and two Utah cases, State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983), and State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). The 
latter rest on the former: Romero relies on Lee, see 660 P.2d at 717-18, and Lee in turn 
relies on Katz, see Lee, 633 P.2d at 50. Thus, the proposition that defendant here offers 
as an example of an expression of state constitutional law is in fact grounded wholly in 
Fourth Amendment law. 
The brief includes no reasoned application of article I, section 14 to the factual 
record, merely conclusory assertions that the facts of the case violate the provision's 
undefined protections. For example, although the brief asserts that transporting suspects 
"to a 'more suitable5 location" is "completely opposed to article I, section 14 as defined 
by this Court," the brief offers no such definition. Br. Pet. at 11. Again, although the 
brief asserts that "under article I, section 14, Trooper Wright's unnecessary seizure of 
Worwood exceeded the scope of an investigative detention," it makes no attempt to 
delineate the scope of an investigative detention under article I, section 14, or to explain 
how that scope might differ from the scope of an investigative detention under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. In addition, although this Court has declared that "divining the intent 
and purpose of the framers" is "a critical aspect of any [state] constitutional 
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interpretation," Society ofSeparationists, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6, defendant's brief makes no 
attempt to argue that the framers of the Utah Constitution would take a different view of 
his detention than would the framers of the United States Constitution. 
Because defendant has offered no rationale for reading the state guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures differently from its federal counterpart, the State is 
unable to respond to the merits of his claim that Trooper Wright's conduct violated that 
guarantee. 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), controls. Brown's opening brief stated 
that the seizure at issue "should have been suppressed under either the state or federal 
constitutions." Id. at 854, n.l. However, "[t]he State correctly noted that Brown's 
analysis of the search and seizure issue proceeded under Fourth Amendment law with no 
effort to analyze the question under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The 
State responded, therefore, by discussing only federal law." Id. (noting that the State 
relied on Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247 n. 5). Brown countered by asserting "an entirely new 
argument" in his reply brief. Id. 
"If we were to review Brown's state constitutional analysis under those 
circumstances," the Court wrote, "he would be rewarded for his omission and given the 
opportunity to present an unopposed analysis." Id. To reach the issue would thus place 
the State in "the difficult position in future cases of either missing the opportunity to brief 
the state constitutional law issue or having to construct and then rebut the unbriefed issue. 
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We prefer," the Court concluded, "to review state constitutional law issues that both 
parties have had an opportunity to brief." Id. Accordingly, the Court treated the issue as 
one raised under the Fourth Amendment only. Id. at 854. 
* * * 
Any thoughtful and probing analysis of a claim based on article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution must include at a minimum a textual and historical exegesis of the 
provision, a comparison of its text to federal and state counterparts, and a reasoned 
application of that text to the factual record. None of that has occurred at any level of this 
litigation. Defendant did not lay any state constitutional claim before the trial court or the 
court of appeals, nor did his petition for certiorari ask this Court to review such a claim. 
His merits brief in this Court ignores the text and history of the provision, fails to explain 
how or why its meaning might depart from its federal counterpart, and undertakes no 
reasoned application of the provision to the factual record in this case. In sum, 
defendant's article I, section 14 claim was defaulted at all previous stages of this litigation 




UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AN OFF-DUTY OFFICER 
DOES NOT EXCEED THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF AN 
INVESTIGATORY DETENTION BY TRANSPORTING A DRIVER 
HE SUSPECTS TO BE INTOXICATED A SHORT DISTANCE TO 
AN ON-DUTY OFFICER FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION 
In a three-page argument, defendant claims that the "unnecessary seizing of 
Worwood and his truck without probable cause and to facilitate officer convenience 
exceeded the scope of an investigative detention and thereby violated the Fourth 
Amendment." Br. Pet. at 15. He further accuses the court of appeals of having "created a 
new personal convenience exception to both article I, section 14, and the Fourth 
Amendment." Id. 
District court's ruling. The district court ruled that "it was reasonable for the 
trooper to transport the defendant a short distance from the mountain ro[ad] where the 
stop occurred to the trooper's home." R. 63. In fact, the court found it was "more fair to 
the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a location that would allow the officer 
to obtain accurate test results." Id. Consequently, the court found, "the defendant was 
not unlawfully detained." Id. 
Court of appeals' ruling. The court of appeals was unable to conclude "that an 
off-duty law enforcement officer exceeds the permissible scope of an investigatory 
detention when he transports a driver he suspects to be intoxicated a short distance from 
an uninhabited area to meet an on-duty officer for further investigation." Worwood, 2005 
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UT App 539, at f^ 9. The court accordingly held that, "[although Trooper Wright may 
have been able to perform a sufficient field sobriety test on Worwood at the point of the 
initial encounter in Deep Canyon and possibly to transport him to the Juab County Jail, it 
was not unreasonable for him to drive Worwood to a nearby location in the town to 
permit an on-duty officer to perform a field sobriety test and, if necessary, effect a formal 
arrest." Id. 
A. The off-duty officer acted reasonably in detaining defendant and 
transporting him to a more suitable site for and on-duty officer 
to conduct field sobriety tests. 
Defendant argues that delay in conducting field sobriety tests converted the 
investigative stop into a "de facto arrest not supported by probable cause, and in violation 
of.. . the Fourth Amendment." Br. Pet. at 9. 
Case law identifies three levels of police/citizen encounters: a voluntary encounter, 
a brief investigative detention {Terry stop), and an arrest. 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime . ..; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense had been 
committed or is being committed. 
State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 10, n.l, 112 P.3d 507 (citation omitted, ellipsis in 
original). "[I]t is settled law that ca police officer may detain and question an individual 
when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is 
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about to be engaged in criminal activity.'" Markland, 2005 UT 26, at ^|10, (quoting State 
v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996)). To justify the detention, "the officer's 
suspicion must be supported by specific and articulable facts and rational inferences, and 
cannot be merely an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." Id. (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
A level two investigatory detention may, at some point, become so overly intrusive 
that it can no longer be characterized as a minimal intrusion designed to confirm quickly 
or dispel the suspicions which justified the initial stop. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 683-86 (1985). When the detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible 
investigative stop, it becomes a de facto arrest, requiring probable cause. Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).4 
Coerciveness of the detention is a factor courts consider in determining whether an 
arrest occurred. "[Rjeadied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns" are often cited as 
"indicia of arrest." Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) (holding 
defendant was not in custody for purposes of self-incrimination). Nevertheless, "stopping 
a suspect at gunpoint, handcuffing him, and making him sit on the ground for a short 
4
 Utah statutory law reflects this distinction. "An arrest is an actual restraint of the 
person arrested or submission to custody." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (West 2004). 
However, "[a] peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (West 2004). 
22 
period . . . do not [necessarily] convert a detention into an arrest." People v. Celis, 16 
Cal.Rptr. 85, 91 (Cal. 2004) (citing numerous cases); accord United States v. Trueber, 
238 F.2d 79, 95 (1st Cir. 2001) ("minimal use of a gun, under the circumstances, does not 
exceed the bounds of a permissible Terry stop"). In any event, no "indicia of arrest" 
were present here: Trooper Wright did not point a gun at defendant, handcuff him, tell 
him he was under arrest, search him incident to arrest, or transport him to the station 
house. 
Another factor in determining whether an arrest has occurred is duration of the 
detention. In assessing whether a detention is "too long in duration to be justified as an 
investigative stop," it is "appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (citations 
omitted). "Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can 
no longer be justified as an investigative stop." Id. at 685. 
However, courts "should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing." Id. at 686. 
"A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always 
imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been 
accomplished." Id. at 686-87. "But '[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in 
the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not, itself, render the 
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search unreasonable." Id. at 687 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 
(1973)). 
Defendant contends that "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop [and] . . . the investigative 
methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or 
dispel the officer's suspicion." Br. Pet. at 13 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
500 (1983) (plurality opinion). This misstates the law. 
A majority of the Court has never adopted the formulation that the Fourth 
Amendment requires officers to employ the "least intrusive means reasonably available to 
verify or dispel the officer's suspicion." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. Royer was a plurality 
opinion. See id. The Royer formulation has never been quoted in a majority opinion of 
the Court. Defendant's brief suggests that it was cited by the majority in Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). See Br. Pet. at 13 (stating that the Royer formulation was 
"cited by Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 420 (2005)"). However, it was in fact cited 
only by Justice Ginsberg in dissent. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 420 ("the investigative 
methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available") (Ginsberg, 
J., dissenting). Similarly, the "least intrusive means reasonably available" language 
appears in Sharpe, but only in the concurring opinion of Justice Marshall and the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 693-94 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment), 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 711-12 (Brennan, J., 
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dissenting), 716, n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In any event, the conceit that the Fourth 
Amendment requires police to employ the least intrusive means "reasonably available" 
merely begs the question of whether the police acted reasonably, which is the gold 
standard against which all police conduct must in any event be judged. 
The court of appeals recently ruled that an investigative stop of over an hour did 
not "assume the character of an arrest." State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, f 16, 101 P.3d 
846 (holding that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes), cert, granted, 
case no. 20050001-SC. The court observed that "it is reasonable for a stop to require 
over an hour when an officer calls support personnel who must travel to the scene." 2004 
UT App 396, | 17. In Levin, the officers were dealing with three suspects at the scene 
and had to perform multiple tasks, including "summoning and awaiting support officers 
trained in drug recognition" and "performing field sobriety tests on each suspect for 
alcohol and drug consumption." Id. The court concluded, "Taken together, a stop lasting 
over an hour under these circumstances is not unreasonable." Id. 
The court of appeals also rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge in a drunk 
driving case where the defendant was briefly detained until a backup officer arrived. In 
State v. Ottesen, 920 P.2d 183 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the court held that Ottesen was 
reasonably detained where, within fifteen minutes of the initial stop, the officer checked 
the driver's and Ottesen's identifications and the vehicle's registration, ran a warrants 
check on the driver, and called for a backup officer to perform a sobriety test. Id. at 185. 
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It took the backup officer five to ten minutes to arrive on the scene. Id. The court held 
that after smelling alcohol on the driver and observing signs of intoxication, and 
notwithstanding the wait while a backup officer arrived, the detaining officer "properly 
and timely investigated his reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the 
influence of alcohol." Id. at 185-86. 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, on facts closely analogous to those at bar, 
held that a brief detention by an off-duty officer until an on-duty officer arrived did not 
transform a Terry stop into a de facto arrest. See Commonwealth v. Gommer, 665 A.2d 
1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). An off-duty police officer observed Gommer driving 
erratically and suspected that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 1273. 
She pulled Gommer over. Id. His eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he 
was uncooperative. Id. at 1271. The off-duty officer identified herself as a member of 
the state police, instructed him to remain at the scene until other troopers arrived, 
informed him that she believed he was driving under the influence of alcohol, and took 
his keys. Id. at 1271, 1273. She "briefly detained him until the arrival of on duty state 
troopers who would be properly equipped to investigate and determine whether appellee 
was, in fact, intoxicated and, if necessary, to take him into custody." Id. at 1274. 
On these facts, the Pennsylvania court held that the off-duty officer's detention of 
Gommer "was not sufficiently coercive to rise to the level of a custodial detention or 
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arrest." Id. Thus, Gommer "was not actually arrested until after [on-duty officers] 
arrived on the scene . . ." Id. 
The same result should obtain here. Trooper Cory Wright acted reasonably under 
the circumstances. He had seen defendant driving a truck. After observing defendant at 
close range, he had reasonably concluded that defendant was intoxicated. He determined 
to detain defendant for field sobriety tests. However, a number of factors militated 
against performing the tests at the canyon location. The record suggests that the town 
would be "a safer location" for the tests than the side of a dirt road, especially where Cory 
was not in his patrol car. R. 91: 5, 10. Also, the canyon road was not conducive to 
accurate testing; indeed, the district court found that it was "more fair to the defendant to 
conduct the field sobriety test in a location that would allow the officer to obtain accurate 
test results." R. 63.5 
In addition, Cory was ill-prepared to effect an arrest in the likely event one should 
prove necessary. He was off duty. R. 92: 4. He was not in his patrol car, but a truck. R. 
92: 4; R. 91: 15. He was pulling a horse trailer and was accompanied by "[a] kid" with 
whom he had been horseback riding. R. 92: 4, 10. He had no cell phone or other means 
of communication. R. 92: 10. Nothing in the record suggests he had handcuffs, a 
sidearm, or any other means of controlling a belligerent arrestee. 
5
 Defendant did not challenge this finding. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, ^ f 9. 
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Consequently, having determined that defendant could not safely drive, Cory 
transported defendant to his own (Wright's) home, which was "right there at the base of 
Deep Canyon." R. 92: 10. The trip down the canyon was obviously brief, since the 
parties traveled only a mile and a half or less. R. 92: 10; cf. 91: 5. Driving a mile and a 
half, even on a dirt road, takes only a few minutes. Nothing in the record suggests that 
Trooper Wright made any unnecessary stops along the way or otherwise dallied in the 
course of transporting defendant out of the canyon. For an off-duty officer to detain a 
suspect and call for an on-duty officer to investigate, interrogate, and if necessary arrest 
the suspect is a common and appropriate course of action. Under the foregoing 
authorities, it does not, without more, transform a Terry stop into a de facto arrest.6 
Finally, transportation of the suspect is a factor to be considered in determining 
whether an arrest has occurred. However, as one commentator has stated, "it seems clear 
that some movement of the suspect in the general vicinity of the stop is permissible 
without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest." 4 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 
9.2(g) (4th ed. 2004). Accord United States v. Charley, 396 F.3d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding that the defendant was not under arrest when officer transported her to her 
6
 At the suppression hearing, defense counsel referred to Trooper Cory Wright's 
having taken defendant "into custody," but Wright himself stated that "he was detained." R. 
92: 14-15. Of course, the constitutional question turns on a totality of the circumstances, not 
on the witnesses' choice of nomenclature. 
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home for questioning); United States v. Montano-Gudino, 309 F.3d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 
2002) (holding that there was no arrest where officers escorted the defendant who was in 
the process of emptying his rented storage unit to a room in the storage facility offices for 
questioning); United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 56 (2d Cir. 2000) ("it is well 
established that officers may ask (or force) a suspect to move as part of a lawful Terry 
stop."); United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2000) (where 
suspect found at door of room 320 of motel, movement of him to nearby room 323 "for 
safety and security purposes" during a Terry stop was lawful); United States v. Vega, 72 
F.3d 507, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant's stop was "not tantamount 
to an arrest" notwithstanding that "the officers drew their weapons, asked [the defendant] 
to accompany them [back to the crime scene] in one of their cars," and kept him in the 
officer's vehicle for over an hour); United States v. Nurse, 916 F.2d 20, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (holding that officers' conduct in preventing the defendant from getting into a taxi 
and escorting her back into the train terminal did not "exceed[ ] the established bounds 
for reasonable suspicion detentions"); United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 792 
(1 lth Cir. 1985) (holding that once defendant consented to search, moving the 
investigation or requiring him to ride in the patrol car to a nearby place where the search 
would be conducted did not convert lawful investigatory stop into an arrest); People v. 
Carlos M., 269 Cal. Rptr. 447, 452, n.4, 452-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that half-
hour drive to hospital for show-up showed "commendable dispatch"); People v. Stevens, 
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517 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Colo. 1973) (holding that, where stop occurred in lobby area of 
prison, it was proper to take the suspect to a nearby conference room to facilitate the 
interrogation); State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me. 1983) (holding that "it is within 
the reasonable scope of an investigatory stop or detention" and did not constitute an arrest 
for the officer to ask the suspect to get out of his car and get into the police cruiser to 
answer questions); State v. Quartana, 570 N.W.2d 618, 621-23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that taking suspect's driver's license and transporting him to the accident scene 
did not exceed the scope of a Terry stop); Eckenrod v. State, 61 P.3d 635, 641 (Wyo. 
2003) (holding that transporting defendant across the street to move away from a hostile 
crowd did not transform Terry stop into an arrest). 
However, transporting a suspect to the police station or to a secluded location for 
interrogation is a factor that may contribute to a finding that a Teriy stop has morphed 
into an arrest. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815-16 (1985) (holding that 
transporting suspect from home to police station for interrogation was an arrest); Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-508 (1983) (holding that police exceeded the limits of a 
Terry stop when they transported airline passenger to a "police room" within airline 
terminal, retained his ticket and driver's license, and retrieved his luggage from the airline 
without his consent); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208-16 (1979) (holding that 
transporting suspect from his neighbor's home to police station and placing him in an 
interrogation room exceeded the limits of a Terry stop). In fact, the Supreme Court has 
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never upheld "the involuntary removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and 
his detention there for investigative purposes . . . absent probable cause or judicial 
authorization." Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 (2003) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 
499 (plurality opinion)). 
Here, defendant was subject merely to a "transport" or "transportation" detention. 
Eckenrod, 67 P.3d at 641; People v. Harris, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540, 541 (Cal. 1975) (en 
banc). Trooper Wright transported him a short distance, requiring only minutes, to a 
location more suitable for the field sobriety tests to be performed by an officer "properly 
equipped to investigate and determine whether [defendant] was, in fact, intoxicated and, 
if necessary, to take him into custody." Gommer, 665 A.2d at 1274. 
The court of appeals properly ruled that this detention did not escalate to an arrest.7 
7
 The off-duty officer may in fact have had probable cause to arrest defendant in any 
event. American Fork City v. Singleton, 2004 UT App 172, addresses the question of 
probable cause in a drunk driving case. When pulled over, Singleton "had glassy, bloodshot 
eyes and was slightly swaying as he talked." Id. at f 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
When the officer tried to perform field sobriety tests, Singleton "became belligerent and 
refused to cooperate." Id. These facts established "probable cause to arrest him for DUI." 
Id. 
Although Singleton's indicia of intoxication do not precisely mirror defendant's here, 
other courts have held that bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and an odor of alcohol support a 
finding of probable cause. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eckert, 728 N.E.2d 312, 319 (Mass. 
2000) (slurred speech, red glassy eyes, and strong odor of alcohol on breath warrant probable 
cause to arrest); State v. Crasco, 11 P.3d 555 (Mont. 2003) (unpublished decision; text at 
2003 WL 22171847) (bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and odor of alcohol supported DUI 
arrest); State v. Kier, 678 N.W. 2d 672, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (strong odor of an 
alcoholic beverage on driver's breath, blood-shot watery eyes, and slurred speech supported 
finding of probable cause). 
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B. The officer's subjective motivation plays no part in Fourth 
Amendment probable cause analysis. 
Trooper Wright acknowledged that one reason he wanted to hand defendant off to 
an on-duty trooper is that he was off duty and "it would have messed up my night." R. 
92: 11. Defendant makes much of this, and even argues that the court of appeals "created 
a new personal convenience exception to both article I, section 14, and the Fourth 
Amendment.55 Br. Pet. at 15; see also Br. Pet. at 11. 
Contrary to defendant's characterization, the Worwood majority did not create a 
"personal convenience exception to the warrant requirement." Pet. at 7. It merely 
declined to hold that "an off-duty law enforcement officer exceeds the permissible scope 
of an investigatory detention when he transports a driver he suspects to be intoxicated a 
short distance from an uninhabited area to meet an on-duty officer for further 
investigation.55 Worwood, 2005 UT App539, f^ 9. It is difficult to see how the court of 
appeals could have created "a new personal convenience exception55 to the Fourth 
Amendment when the officer's "personal convenience55 played no role in the majority's 
rationale. See Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, fflf 6-9. 
Nor should it. "[T]he subjective motivations of the individual officers . . . ha[ve] 
no bearing on whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.55 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); accord Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
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806, 813 (1996) ("subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis"). "An action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, cas long as the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justify [the] action.'" Brigham City, No. 05-502, Slip op. at 5, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-502.pdf (quoting Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (emphasis added by Brigham City)). 
Consequently, Trooper Cory Wright's subjective motivation for acting as he did 
"does not matter here." Id. All that matters is that his actions were objectively 
reasonable. 
C. Even assuming arguendo that defendant was illegally arrested, 
he has failed to demonstrate that the evidence against him was 
"fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Even if Trooper Cory Wright inadvertently effected a de facto arrest and that arrest 
was illegal due to lack of probable cause, defendant is nevertheless not entitled to reversal 
of his conviction without demonstrating that the police obtained the challenged evidence 
by exploiting his arrest. 
"[A]n illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction." Thomas 
v. State, 2002 UT 128, f 7, 63 P.3d 672 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 
(1975)). Nor does an illegal arrest automatically require the suppression of all evidence 
acquired after the arrest. Brown v. Illinois, All U.S. 590, 599 (1975). The Supreme Court 
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has "eschewed any per se or 'but for' rule . . . [;] the relevant inquiry [is whether the 
evidence sought to be used against a defendant was] "obtained by exploitation of the 
illegality of his arrest," Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 217 (quoting Brown, All U.S. at 600). 
Thus, only evidence "obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful 
invasion"—that is, "fruit of the poisonous tree"—is excluded. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 487-88 (1963). See also State v. Schreuder,l\l P.2d 264, 271 
(Utah 1985) ("The remedy for an unlawful arrest is the suppression of evidence obtained 
thereby."). 
"Evidence seized during an unlawful arrest, or statements made by the person 
unlawfully arrested while in custody, are products of the arrest and will be suppressed." 
United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1509 (11th Cir. 1986) (denying suppression). 
"Evidence with only a loose causal connection to an illegal arrest, however, will not be 
suppressed." Id. (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). Suppression follows only if a 
"causal chain" connects the illegal arrest to the challenged evidence. State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684, 691 (Utah 1990). That causal chain is absent here. 
Defendant does assert that "evidence in this case was obtained as a direct result of 
the unlawful seizure of Worwood." Br. Pet. at 12. However, analysis of the facts 
establishes that the evidence he seeks to have suppressed was fruit of the initial detention, 
not "fruit of an illegal arrest." State v. Heaps, 711 P.2d 257, 258 (Utah 1985) (declining 
to reach an unpreserved Fourth Amendment issue). 
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The case at bar is not the typical one where a defendant seeks to suppress evidence 
seized or statements made during the course of an allegedly illegal arrest. Defendant here 
challenges the results of alcohol testing conducted on the basis of pre-detention 
reasonable suspicion. Even before Trooper Cory Wright transported defendant, he "could 
see that he had been drinking/5 that "he was very intoxicated." R. 92: 9, 13. This 
observation, not the purportedly illegal detention, led to the field sobriety and breath tests 
and defendant's eventual arrest. 
Defendant argues that Trooper Wright could and should have administered the 
field sobriety tests up the canyon. See Br. Pet. at 10-11. He speculates that, in effect, he 
was not intoxicated up the canyon, but became intoxicated in the minutes it took to drive 
down the canyon. Br. Pet. at 12 (Worwood's blood-alcohol level was likely changing"). 
He argues that "[i]t cannot be presumed that the results of the field sobriety tests would 
have been the same had they been conducted at the scene of the stop." Id. Of course, the 
question is not whether the results of tests preformed up the canyon would have been "the 
same" as the eventual tests, but whether defendant would have passed. All relevant 
record evidence indicates that he would not have. Up the canyon, defendant's speech was 
"slow and slurred," his eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled of alcohol. R. 92: 8-9; R. 91: 
4; R. 60, 62. Trooper Wright saw that defendant was "very intoxicated." R. 92: 8, 13. 
Thus, even if the tests had been given in defendant's preferred location, he would still 
have failed, still have been arrested, and still have been convicted of DUI. 
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United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 203 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), 
illustrates the need for a causal link between the purported illegality and the evidence 
sought to be suppressed. There, police legally stopped a van, removed and handcuffed 
the occupants and placed them in a patrol car. Id. at 357. They then approached the van, 
smelled marijuana, and searched the van. Id. The Fifth Circuit noted, "The officers' 
ability to smell the marihuana in the van and their decision and ability to search the van 
depended in no way on the manner in which they had previously detained the appellants 
after the stop." Id. The court reiterated that "there was no causal link between the post-
stop alleged 'illegal' arrest of the appellants and the search of the van, which resulted in 
the seizure of [the challenged evidence]." Id. at 357-58. Accordingly, the evidence could 
not be suppressed. Id. at 358. 
Obviously, the specific facts of Ibarra-Sanchez differ from those at bar, but the 
cases are alike in this: the challenged evidence was not the fruit of the alleged 
constitutional violation. See State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(holding that fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine requires exclusion only of evidence 
"obtained through a violation" of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments). 
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the detention was illegal, the results of the 
field sobriety tests are not suppressive. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted o r / y | / M a y 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
VOROS, JR. 
hief, Criminal Appeals Division 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
%1 Mitchell Worwood appeals the district court's ruling denying 
his motion to suppress evidence taken during sobriety tests. We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 On June 20, 2 0 03, Korey Wright, an off-duty Utah Highway 
Patrol trooper, and his friend, Skyler Fautin, were driving 
Wright's pickup truck and horse trailer on a dirt road out of 
Deep Canyon in Juab County when they encountered a white pickup 
truck parked in the middle of the road. At the time, Worwood, 
the driver of the truck, had exited the vehicle, but soon 
reentered and drove it to the side of the road to allow Trooper 
Wright and his truck to pass. Trooper Wright noticed a large wet 
spot in the road, a beer can, and later an ice cooler that 
apparently had been recently emptied. 
f3 Trooper Wright pulled his vehicle alongside Worwood's to 
speak to him. During the conversation, Trooper Wright noted that 
17 
Worwood, who was sitting in the driver's seat, had bloodshot eyes 
and slurred speech. Trooper Wright exited his vehicle to 
continue the conversation and testified that he smelled alcohol 
on Worwood's breath.1 All of these signs led Trooper Wright to 
believe that Worwood was likely intoxicated and could not safely 
operate a vehicle. Trooper Wright told Worwood that he would not 
allow him to drive until he had been checked out by a police 
officer. Worwood appeared to recognize that Trooper Wright was a 
law enforcement officer and complied with the request. Because 
Trooper Wright did not have a telephone or other means of 
communication, he instructed Fautin to drive Worwood's vehicle to 
a nearby dairy and call for an officer to respond at Trooper 
Wright's house. Trooper Wright then asked Worwood to accompany 
him there, to which Worwood agreed, and Trooper Wright drove him 
approximately a mile and a half to his house. There, they met an 
on-duty trooper who performed a field sobriety test, determined 
there was probable cause to arrest, and transported Worwood to 
the Juab County Jail where further tests revealed a breath 
alcohol concentration of .248.2 
H4 Before trial, Worwood moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the sobriety test, claiming it was obtained by 
means of an illegal seizure. The trial court held an evidentiary 
hearing and found that Trooper Wright had noticed signs of 
intoxication early in the encounter, including bloodshot eyes, 
slurred speech, and " [a]fter talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer 
proximity, Trooper Wright also smelled the odor of alcohol." The 
trial court also found that testing Worwood at another location 
was necessary because "it was more fair to the defendant to 
conduct the field sobriety test in a location that would allow 
the officer to obtain accurate test results." The trial court 
1Worwood claims on appeal that Trooper Wright smelled 
alcohol on Worwood's breath only after Worwood was seated in 
Trooper Wright's pickup truck, but fails to challenge the trial 
court's finding that Trooper Wright smelled the odor of alcohol 
on Worwood's breath " [a]fter talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer 
proximity" but before asking him to ride with him in the truck. 
See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1,1|67, 63 P.3d 731 (noting that a 
trial court's finding of fact is conclusive unless appellant 
proves the trial court committed clear error and marshals all the 
record evidence in support of and against the finding). 
2The arresting officer testified that Worwood had a blood 
alcohol content of ".248 liters," which presumably means a level 
of .248 grams per 210 liters of breath. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44(2) (c) (Supp. 2002) (renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 
(2005)). 
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denied the motion, concluding that under these circumstances 
Trooper Wright had a reasonable suspicion to execute a level-two 
investigatory detention and that driving Worwood to Trooper 
Wright's house was a reasonable extension of that detention. We 
agree and affirm. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1[5 On appeal, Worwood claims that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress because (1) Trooper Wright did not 
have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to effect an investigatory 
detention and (2) when Trooper Wright drove him to Trooper 
Wright's house to perform the field sobriety test, the encounter 
became a de facto arrest for which there was no probable cause. 
We review the trial court's legal basis for denying Worwood's 
motion for correctness without deference to the trial court's 
application of the law to the facts. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 
95,1(15, 103 P.3d 699. 
ANALYSIS 
f6 Worwood first contends that Trooper Wright did not have 
sufficient grounds to execute an investigatory detention. "[I]t 
is settled law that 'a police officer may detain and question an 
individual when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in 
criminal activity.'" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,1(10, 112 P.3d 
507 (quoting State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996)). 
Although the officer's suspicion must be based on "'specific and 
articulable facts and rational inferences,'" it need not be 
supported by probable cause or even a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 
1407 (10th Cir. 1990)). In reviewing an officer's conduct under 
the Fourth Amendment, we consider the facts in their totality and 
"'judge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and 
ordinary human experience and . . . accord deference to an 
officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious 
actions.'" Id. at Kll (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
1|7 Here, Trooper Wright effected a level-two investigative 
detention after seeing an empty beer can, a large wet spot, and 
later an empty cooler. He also noticed signs that Worwood was 
intoxicated, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the 
odor of alcohol on his breath. These indicators, combined with 
the fact that Worwood apparently intended to continue driving, 
justify the reasonable and common sense inference that Worwood 
had been or was about to drive a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 
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%8 Second, Worwood contends that when Trooper Wright drove him 
to another location to perform a field sobriety test he exceeded 
the scope of the investigative detention and effected a de facto 
arrest. After commencing an investigative detention, officers 
must "'"dilligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant."1" State 
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted). Defendant correctly observes that 
an investigative detention may become a de facto arrest requiring 
probable cause when police transport a suspect to a new location. 
See, e.g., Dunawav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979). 
However, while courts acknowledge that the precise point at which 
an investigative detention becomes a de facto arrest is not 
clear, an important factor in determining when an arrest has 
occurred is whether the degree of intrusion is not "reasonably 
related to the facts and circumstances at hand." State v. 
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We recognize 
the "'important need to allow authorities to graduate their 
responses to the demands of any particular situation,'" and the 
fact that we could conceive of less intrusive means to resolve a 
suspicion does not alone render an officer's efforts to resolve 
the suspicion unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 
675, 686-87 (1985) (citation omitted). Rather, we consider only 
whether the officer's failure to pursue such other means was 
unreasonable. See id. 
%9 We appreciate the concerns expressed by our colleague in his 
dissent and note that Trooper Wright's mode of investigation 
would be permissible only in the rarest of circumstances and that 
this case ultimately turns on the unique set of facts it 
presents, albeit on a sparse record. Upon review of the known 
facts, we cannot conclude that an off-duty law enforcement 
officer exceeds the permissible scope of an investigatory 
detention when he transports a driver he suspects to be 
intoxicated a short distance from an uninhabited area to meet an 
on-duty officer for further investigation. Trooper Wright 
testified that he was returning from horseback riding in a pickup 
truck with an attached horse trailer, had no means of 
communication, and was not equipped to make a formal arrest. 
Trooper Wright indicated to Worwood that the detention was 
temporary and for investigatory purposes by explaining that he 
could not allow him to drive "until he had been checked out by an 
officer." Although Trooper Wright may have been able to perform 
a sufficient field sobriety test on Worwood at the point of the 
initial encounter in Deep Canyon and possibly to transport him to 
the Juab County Jail, it was not unreasonable for him to drive 
Worwood to a nearby location in the town to permit an on-duty 
officer to perform a field sobriety test and, if necessary, 
effect a formal arrest. Further, the trial court found that 
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conducting the sobriety test in town would "allow the officer to 
obtain accurate test results." Worwood has not challenged this 
finding and has not alleged that the results of the sobriety test 
would have been substantially different if conducted minutes 
earlier. Finally, there is no evidence that the change of 
location significantly extended the encounter, and the record 
gives no indication that under these unique circumstances Trooper 
Wright was motivated by any purpose other than quickly and 
effectively resolving his suspicion that Worwood was intoxicated. 
flO Accordingly, we affirm. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
II11 I CONCUR: 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting): 
Kl2 I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that 
this case presents merely a level two stop of reasonable scope 
and duration. 
Hl3 First and foremost, I believe that Trooper Wright made a de 
facto arrest of Worwood when he took physical custody of Worwood 
and transported him from the canyon where the initial encounter 
occurred to Wright's private residence. As a level three 
encounter, this arrest was illegal because it was not supported 
by probable cause. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1136, 63 P.3d 
65 0 ("A level three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy detention that 
requires probable cause." (alterations omitted) (quotations and 
citations omitted)). However, even if Wright's actions created 
only a level two encounter, Worwood's detention was unreasonable 
in both its scope and its duration. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 
2000 UT App 55#1l0, 998 P.2d 274 ("[A level two] 'detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop [.] '" (citation omitted)). Wright's 
actions violated the Fourth Amendment under either analysis, and 
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I would suppress all evidence obtained as a result of those 
actions. 
1[l4 The only competent evidence of the events surrounding 
Worwood's encounter with Wright was Wright's testimony at the 
suppression hearing.1 Wright testified that he took Worwood into 
custody after observing his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. 
Rather than perform field sobriety tests on Worwood at the scene, 
however, Wright transported him in Wright's private vehicle out 
of the canyon, onto the state highway, and to Wright's private 
residence2 in Levan, Utah, a distance of "about a mile and a 
half." Wright testified that he believed that Worwood knew he 
was a law enforcement officer. Wright entrusted Worwoodfs 
vehicle to Wright's passenger, and the passenger drove the 
vehicle to a local dairy to call for assistance, and then to 
Wright's residence. 
Kl5 These actions represent a significant seizure of Worwood and 
his vehicle, and any reasonable person in Worwood's position 
would have interpreted these actions as an arrest. Accordingly, 
I would hold that Wright effected a level three arrest as soon as 
Worwood became aware that he was in police custody, that his 
vehicle had been seized, and that he was going to be transported 
a significant distance for the purpose of being handed off to 
another officer. See State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 674 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (Orme, J., dissenting) ("The accepted rule is that 
what might have otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a 
level-three de facto arrest when, in view of all the 
circumstances, a reasonable, innocent person in the suspect's 
place would believe himself to be under arrest."); see also 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (characterizing the 
relevant inquiry as whether the suspect believed he was being 
detained). I would also hold that Wright's observations of 
Worwood provided only a reasonable suspicion that Worwood was 
xThe trooper who formally arrested Worwood testified at the 
preliminary hearing, but he offered only hearsay testimony about 
the circumstances of Worwood's initial detention and transport. 
2The fact that Wright chose to transport Worwood to his 
private residence gives me additional concern. While it does not 
appear to have been a factor in this case, the transport of a 
lone detainee to a private residence, in an unmarked car by an 
off-duty officer, could present significant cause for alarm to 
the detainee, particularly if it occurred at night. If the 
officer was an imposter, discomfort could escalate into grave 
danger. I do not believe that this is the sort of scenario that 
we wish to encourage by excusing Wright's actions in this case. 
20040701-CA 6 
driving while intoxicated, but not the level of probable cause 
required to make an arrest.3 
Hl6 Wright's reasonable suspicion clearly justified some 
detention of Worwood for further investigation. However, Wright 
exceeded the permissible scope and duration of that detention 
when he transported Worwood to his home for performance of field 
sobriety tests that could just as easily have been conducted at 
the initial scene. "Officers must diligently pursue a means of 
investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly[.]" State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41,^12, 107 
P.3d 706 (quotations and citation omitted). Wright testified 
that he could have performed field sobriety tests at the scene of 
the initial encounter, but chose not to for the sole reason of 
personal convenience.4 The resulting increase in both the scope 
and the duration of Worwood's detention were therefore 
unnecessary and exceeded the legal boundaries of an otherwise 
legitimate level two stop. See id. at |^15 ("Investigative acts 
that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the 
articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do 
not add to the delay already lawfully experienced and do not 
represent any further intrusion on [the detainee's] rights." 
(alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)). 
fl7 The majority suggests that Worwood's transport was also 
justified by Wright's motive to obtain more accurate results from 
3Wright testified that the only evidence of Worwood's 
intoxication at the time of his initial detention was his 
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. He testified that he only 
smelled alcohol on Worwood once he and Worwood were inside 
Wright's vehicle. Accordingly, Worwood's arrest preceded 
Wright's observation of the smell of alcohol, and that evidence 
cannot be used to bolster the legality of Worwood's initial 
arrest. Even taking the smell of alcohol into account, however, 
I believe that Wright could only objectively be said to have had 
a reasonable suspicion of Worwood's intoxication. 
4Wright, being off duty, did not want to "mess [] up [his] 
night" by incurring the responsibility for Worwood's potential 
arrest and its accompanying paperwork. Instead, he wanted to 
hand off the situation to a fellow officer. While I find this 
motivation understandable, Wright, having chosen to exercise the 
power of the State to investigate Worwood despite his off-duty 
status, owed Worwood the full complement of constitutional 
rights. I do not believe that those rights permit the scope or 
duration of a level two stop to be extended on the basis of an 
officer's desire to avoid the responsibility of otherwise 
necessary paperwork. 
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field sobriety tests. I find this unavailing, as field sobriety 
tests are routinely performed roadside in less than ideal 
conditions. Further, such a justification would permit the 
routine "relocation" of drunken driving suspects to a jail or 
police station where environmental factors such as light, sound, 
and footing could be controlled. 
fl8 For these reasons,5 I would hold that Wright's actions 
constitute both a level three stop unsupported by probable cause, 
and an impermissible departure from the allowable scope and 
duration of a legitimate level two stop. Under either analysis, 
the challenged evidence must be suppressed and Worwood's 
conviction reversed. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
5I believe reversal is warranted solely on the basis of 
violations of Worwood's Fourth Amendment rights. However, I 
cannot help looking beyond the immediate case and seeing in the 
majority opinion a green light for the routine transport of 
drunken driving suspects on the flimsiest of excuses. In my 
opinion, today's result opens the door for all manners of 
avoidance of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. For 
example, the resulting ability to make an inventory search of a 
suspect's vehicle will provide a strong incentive for law 
enforcement to "smell alcohol" and transport the suspect and his 
vehicle, allowing them to make an otherwise impermissible search 
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This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being 
fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
1. On or about June 20, 2003, Korey Wright, an off duty highway patrolman, was in 
the area of Deep Canyon when he observed a pickup truck stopped in the middle of the road. 
Near the truck, Trooper Wright saw a man, a wet spot in the road, and a beer can. Trooper 
Wright observed the man get in the truck and pull it over to the side of the road so that Trooper 
Wright could pass. Trooper Wright later observed a cooler that appeared to have been recently 
emptied. 
2. Trooper Wright stopped to talk to the man, who was later identified as Mitchell 
Worwood. While talking to Mr. Worwood, Trooper Wright noticed Mr. Worwood had blood 
shot eyes and slurred speech. After talking with Mr. Worwood at a closer proximity, Trooper 
Wright also smelled the odor of alcohol. Based on these observations, Trooper Wright believed 
that Mr. Worwood was intoxicated and was unable to safely operate his vehicle. Due to this 
belief, Trooper Wright indicated to Mr. Worwood that he was not going to allow Mr. Worwood 
to drive until he had been checked out by an officer. Trooper Wright testified that Mr. Worwood 
was not free to leave at this point. 
3. Trooper Wright did not have a telephone or other means to communicate with law 
enforcement. Due to this fact, Trooper Wright asked Mr. Worwood to ride with him in the 
trooper's truck and have another individual drive Mr. Worwood's truck to Trooper Wright's 
house, which was nearby, in order to meet a law enforcement officer. Mr. Worwood then got 
into Trooper Wright's truck, Trooper Wright's passenger got into Mr. Worwood's truck, and 
they all drove a short distance to Trooper Wright's house. 
4. Another highway patrol trooper, Kevin Wright, responded to Korey Wright's 
house and took over this investigation. Trooper Kevin Wright administered field sobriety tests to 
the Defendant. The Defendant failed these tests, and Trooper Kevin Wright arrested Mr. 
Worwood. 
RULING 
The "right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures" is guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Generally, there are three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between police 
officers and the public: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop', (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
Ruling Page 2 
617-18 (Utah 1987)). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that a person is not seized when a police officer 
merely approaches the person on the street and asks questions if the person stopped is willing to 
listen. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah Ct. App 1987). In this case, Trooper Wright 
approached Mr. Worwood and asked what he was doing. At this point, Mr. Worwood was 
willing to listen and answer the trooper's questions. The defendant was free to leave, and 
Trooper Wright had not shown any authority over the defendant. Therefore, this Court finds that 
the trooper's initial interaction with the defendant was a level one interaction. 
A person is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when an officer 
deprives a person of his liberty by means of physical force or show of authority. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App 1987). Under the Fourth 
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be a reasonable 
basis for even a brief investigatory detention and officers must have a "reasonable suspicion, based 
on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47, 51 (1979). Whether the objective facts known to the officer support a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances and in light of the officer's 
experience and training. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, while the trooper was speaking with the defendant, the trooper noticed that 
the defendant had blood shot eyes, that his speech was slurred, and that the defendant had an odor 
of alcohol on his breath. The trooper also observed the defendant's truck, an empty beer can, a 
wet spot, and an emptied cooler in the middle of the mountain road. Mr. Worwood also indicated 
to the trooper that he had stopped to urinate. These observations in totality caused the trooper to 
believe that Mr. Worwood was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was unable to 
safely operate his vehicle. 
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The Court finds that under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant was committing a crime and lawfully detained the defendant to 
investigate. See, State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah Ct App. 1991). The encounter escalated 
to a level two encounter when Trooper Wright told the defendant that he could not drive his 
vehicle until he had been checked out by another officer. The trooper also testified that the 
defendant was not free to leave at this point. 
The defendant argues that his detention became illegal when the trooper required him to 
ride to another location and wait for another trooper to conduct field sobriety tests. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that an investigatory detention must be "temporary and last no longer 
than is'necessary to effect the purpose of the stop." State v. Deitman, 739 P 2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987). 
In this case, the Court finds that it was reasonable for the trooper to transport the 
defendant a short distance from the mountain rode where the stop occurred to the trooper's 
home. The Court finds that transporting the defendant to another location was reasonable under 
the circumstances and that it was more fair to the defendant to conduct the field sobriety test in a 
location that would allow the officer to obtain accurate test results. Additionally, the Court finds 
under the circumstances that it was reasonable for Trooper Korey Wright to hand off the 
investigation of DUI to another trooper in that the DUI statutes allow the trooper to hand off a 
DUI investigation and the trooper's actions did not cause an unreasonable delay in the 
investigation. Therefore, the Court finds that the defendant was not unlawfully detained. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
denied. 
DATED this / 0 day of April, 2004 
Ruling Page 5 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 031600152 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Dated this \ (f day of 
Mail SCOTT P CARD 
ATTORNEY DEF 
39 W 300 N 
PROVO, UT 84601 
By Hand JARED W ELDRIDGE 
Li , 20Dl/ . 
Dejaufcy Cour 
Page 1 (last) 
Addendum C 
i ^  A r; r u T / 
LTI lit' ~o n, s: i 
- 1 -
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






L. WORWOOD, ) 
Defendant. ) 
QRjpJNAL 
Case No. 031600152 FS 
Suppression Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
February 6, 2004 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE DONALD J. EYRE 
Fouth District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
Jared W. Eldndqe 
160 No. Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435)623-3460 
Scott P. Card 
39 West 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801)377-8844 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT 
1909 South Washington Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-0027 
INDEX 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS] 




WITNESS: CORY WRIGHT PAGE 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. ELDRIDGE 4 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. CARD 12 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY; MR. ELDRIDGE 16 
-oOo-
-3-
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on February 6, 2004) 
THE COURT: Okay State of Utah vs. Mitchell Worwood. 
Okay, this is here for a suppression hearing. Do you have 
evidence other than what we had at preliminary hearing or are you 
gonna — 
MR. CARD: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Yes, your Honor. I think that the relevant 
portion of the motion has to do Trooper Cory Wright's home — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: — and so — 
THE COURT: Come forward and be sworn. 
THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you 
are about to give in this case now pending before the Court will 
be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: And is it okay if we just stipulate that 
Kevin Wright's testimony from the preliminary hearing is 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Why don't we just let him go right now. I 
don't think any of that's even relevant. 




1 CORY WRIGHT 
2 having been first duly sworn, 
3 testifies as follows: 
4 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. ELDRIDGE: 
6 Q. All right, Trooper Wright, can you state your name and 
7 spell your last name for the record? 
8 A. Cory Wright, W-r-i-g-h-t. 
9 Q. Okay. And are you employed by the Highway Patrol? 
10 A. I am. 
11 Q. And were you — well, actually I don't remember the 
12 date. 
13 A. Six, twenty-two. 
14 Q. On June 22nd, did you happen to — June 22nd or June 20th? 
15 A. I have 6-22 on my statement, now whether that's — well 
16 let me see, it was 6-20. 
17 Q. On June 20th of last year, did you come into contact with 
18 Mr. Worwood? 
19 A. I did. 
20 Q. And were you on duty that day? 
21 A. I was not. I think I worked that day but it was when I 
22 was off duty. 
23 Q. Okay. What were you doing? 
24 A. Me and another person that lives in Levan were up Deep 
25 Canyon riding our horses — 
~5
~ 
1 Q. Okay. 
2 A. — riding my horses, so — 
3 Q. As you were out riding horses did you find anything or 
4 see anything that — 
5 A. We went riding up Deep Canyon on our way back towards 
6 the bottom of the canyon just maybe few blocks off of the highway 
7 we encountered a pick up truck that was actually parked in the 
8 middle of the road in a diagonal manner. There was an individual 
9 standing outside that vehicle. There was a big wet spot on the 
10 road and then there was a beer can, it was kind of crushed there 
11 in the road. The individual saw us, got in his vehicle and 
12 pulled it to where — to where we could pass him. 
13 Q. Okay, so when you first saw the vehicle, was it out in 
14 the roadway where traffic goes or was it — 
15 A. Well, it was in — it was on the dirt road and it was 
16 parked kind of in the middle of the road in a diagonal manner so 
17 no vehicles could pass. 
18 Q. Would it help to draw a picture. 
19 A. It don't matter. 
2 0 Q. Would you mind just stepping over here to the board and 
21 just drawing a picture so we can see? 
22 A. Little dirt road, the vehicle was parked kind of like 
23 this in the road. Behind the vehicle was I believe where the wet 
24 spot was with the beer can. The individual got back in his 
25 vehicle and he pulled it here and then stopped and then I 
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1 proceeded to pull right next to the individual and I had my horse 
2 trailer on with me and that's where I made first contact speaking 
3 with him. 
4 Q. So at the time you saw the truck you were also driving? 
5 A. I was driving my — my dodge, correct. 
6 Q. Was it the way his truck parked that block you from 
7 proceeding down the road? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Okay. Could you tell what he was doing outside the 
10 vehicle? 
11 A. It appeared that he was dumping some water out of a 
12 cooler cause it was big enough — I know — I know after I spoke 
13 with him he stated that he was using the bathroom or something, 
14 but the spot was big enough that it wasn't someone that went to 
15 the bathroom; he had emptied water out of a cooler and such and I 
16 later found a cooler full of ice with alcohol in it so — 
17 Q. Okay, so when you pulled up to next to the person, you 
18 say you stopped? 
19 A. I did stop. 
20 Q. Did you talk with that person? 
21 A. I did. I stopped, pulled next to him and as you can see 
22 we're both facing west and so he was — he rolled down his window 
23 and where there was a beer can in the road I felt that that was, 
24 you know, I should say I was off duty but my law enforcement, my 
25 job kicked in and I thought, well, maybe this guy has been 
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1 drinking and so I pulled up next to him and looked at him and I 
2 said is everything okay and he said, "Yeah," as he stated he 
3 stopped to go to the bathroom. 
4 The way he was talking, he was talking slow, slurred. 
5 He had blood shot eyes that you could see and so I got out of my 
6 vehicle at that point once I talked to him a little bit, I felt 
7 like, hey, maybe I'll — I need to get next to this guy. He 
8 appears to be intoxicated, have alcohol in his — 
9 Q. Let me ask you just a couple questions. 
10 A. Okay. 
11 Q. When you were talking with him before you get out of 
12 your car --
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. -- you're sitting behind the driver's wheel? 
15 A. Mine, yes. 
16 Q. And where is he at? 
17 A. He's behind the — he's behind the driver — he's 
18 driving the vehicle. He never left the vehicle once he got in, 
19 pulled up and then he stopped and that's when I pulled next to 
20 him so he's still behind the wheel and his engine's running as 
21 he's talking with me. 
22 Q. Okay, so did you have your passenger roll down his 
23 window? 
24 A. No, I have electric windows so I rolled the window down. 
25 Q. So you rolled it down? 
1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. But you're talking to him through — 
3 A. I'm talking to him across, like probably from here to 
4 where the Judge area is. That's probably how far. I pulled 
5 right next to him. 
6 Q. Okay. All right, and then — and from that distance you 
7 noted those things that you mentioned? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. Okay. 
10 A. Yeah. 
11 Q. The blood shot eyes — 
12 A. Yeah. 
13 Q. The poor — 
14 A. Well, and then his speech was slow and slurred. He 
15 was — from there I made the determination that he — this guys 
16 got some alcohol in him and so that's when I got out of my 
17 vehicle, came around and talked to him, said, "You know, we'd 
18 better have a trooper look at you before you drive anymore/' 
19 Q. Okay. When you got out of your car and came around, did 
20 you notice anything else that you thought was noteworthy? 
21 A. I didn't — not that, you know, not that I can — 
22 Q. Any odors or — 
2 3 A. Well, when I got next to him — 
24 MR. CARD: Your Honor, I'm going to object as to the 
25 leading nature of that question. He asked a question and the 
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answer and then started to lead as to what he's looking for. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
THE WITNESS: That's okay. When I got them — let me 
read from here. Bloodshot eyes, I could see that he had been 
drinking, I got out of my truck, went over to the driver and he 
stated 
that — I could see that he had been drinking. I'm sure I 
smelled alcohol, I mean — 
Q. BY MR. ELDRIDGE: Do you have an independent recollection 
of that today? 
A. Well, when he got in my vehicle and I drove him, yeah, 
he had alcohol in his system or I could smell alcohol and I know 
it wasn't coming from my vehicle if that's — you know so — 
Q. All right, so when you got out of your car and you went 
around to talk to — 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. — him, was there any other conversation that took place 
there? 
A. I — let me see. I asked him for his driver's license 
at this point and his name was Mitchell — not really — not that 
I recall so — 
Q. So at that point you — you thought that he needed to be 
checked by a highway patrolman — 
A. By an officer, yeah. 
Q. Okay, and so at that point what did you do? 
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1 A. I had Mitchell get out of the vehicle. A kid 
2 named — Skyler Fautin was with me and Skyler — I asked Skyler 
3 to get in the vehicle — his vehicle; it was a work vehicle, a 
4 construction truck, and I asked Skyler to take the truck to the 
5 dairy where he could call and have someone respond to my house 
6 and he did so. I went back and picked up the beer can and the 
7 beer can was a fourth of the way full and so anyway Skyler met me 
8 down at 
9 the — down at my house. They had Kevin Wright respond. He 
10 responded. Mr. Worwood never left my sight during the time where 
11 I had him and he was in my vehicle we took him — we actually 
12 went to my own house, it's right there at the base of Deep Canyon 
13 and where Officer Wright did field sobriety tests. 
14 Q. Did — how far from where you encountered Mr. Worwood to 
15 your house is it? 
16 A. It's probably about a mile and a half, so just above the 
17 dairy. 
18 Q. When you were out there on the dirt road, did you have 
19 any means of contacting law enforcement? 
20 A. No. I don't have a cell phone. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. I, you know, and that's why I had Skyler Fautin take the 
23 truck in. He actually went through — went to the dairy and 
24 I called the sheriff's office and then responded back to my house. 
25 
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1 After it was all said and done, Officer Wright arrested 
2 Mr. Worwood. He was really concerned about his vehicle cause it 
3 was a construction vehicle, and I said well, what I'll do is I'll 
4 take your vehicle and I'll drive it to your home in which I did. 
5 I followed Officer Wright. Skyler Fautin followed me in 
6 his own personal vehicle to Mr. Worwood's home where I left the 
7 vehicle. I gave the key to the vehicle I believe to his mother 
8 and then I got a ride back to my own home from Skyler Fautin. 
9 Q. Okay. 
10 A. So — 
11 Q. Back on the dirt road when you were concerned that he 
12 might be intoxicated — 
13 A. Uh-huh. 
14 Q. — did you perform any field sobriety tests at that 
15 point? 
16 A. No, no. I've got my experience and training — because 
17 I was off duty I didn't — I didn't want to — you know it would 
18 have messed up my night so I wanted another officer to come and 
19 do those and because such I did not, so — 
20 Q. Okay. Why did you have Mr. Worwood come down to your 
21 house instead of just staying there where his car was? 
22 A. No way of communication. It was easiest to put him in 
23 my vehicle and drive him there and have him meet me down there, 
24 so — 
25 MR. ELDRIDGE: Those are all the questions I have for 
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1 now. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Card, cross. 
3 MR. CARD: Thank you. 
4 CROSS EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. CARD: 
6 Q. Trooper, with the truck here how far up the road were 
7 you when you first noticed the truck that was parked? 
8 A. I was a ways up the road. 
9 Q. Okay, so he saw you, pulled it over. You didn't have to 
10 stop and wait or anything. He pulled over before you got there; 
11 is that right? 
12 A. Correct. I observed the spot and then the beer can so I 
13 stopped and asked what was — see if he was okay. 
14 Q. I imagine the beer can was partially crushed, correct? 
15 A. Yeah. I believe so. 
16 Q. And you don't have that beer can, do you? 
17 A. I put it back in his vehicle, yeah. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. After I emptied it, I should say. 
20 Q. And no where in your statement or your testimony did he 
21 ever say that he had been drinking or that there was any other 
22 beer cans; is that correct? 
23 A. In my statement? 
24 Q. Right. 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. And nor in your statement or anywhere in your arrest 
2 report is there any cooler that's mentioned as being part of the 
3 inventory of the vehicle; is that correct? 
4 A. Yes, the vehicle wasn't inventoried. The vehicle was 
5 released to his family because — well, because he was pretty 
6 decent when speaking with me as we were waiting for Officer 
7 Wright. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. So I did that out of courtesy for someone that lives in 
10 the same community as I do. 
11 Q.' Based on your statement, let me read this to you and see 
12 if this is accurate today as it was back then. It says, he stated 
13 that he stopped to go to the bathroom. From the way he was 
14 talking and his blood shot eyes, I could see that he had been 
15 drinking. 
16 So from his speech and his bloodshot eyes you concluded 
17 that he had been drinking; is that correct? 
18 A. He had been drinking or there was something wrong, 
19 so — 
20 Q. Just from his bloodshot eyes and just from speech that I 
21 think you stated had been slurred, right? 
22 A. Yeah. He was very intoxicated. 
23 Q. Okay. 
24 A. so — 
25 Q. And, you also — and then you stated, "I got out of my 
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1 truck, went over to the white truck and had him get out and 
2 stated that I was not going to let him drive until a Trooper 
3 looked at him." so there was no other evidence that you got in 
4 your possession other than bloodshot eyes and his speech and you 
5 then detained him, said he wasn't going to drive until somebody 
6 else looked at him, correct? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. And Skyler Fautin could have gone down and had any 
9 trooper, any sheriff, anybody else come up that canyon if it's 
10 that close, correct, and just tell (inaudible) they're up on that 
11 road; it's the only road into the canyon. 
12 A. Yeah, you're correct, you're correct there, yeah, they 
13 could have done that. 
14 Q. And so — but instead you chose to take him into your 
15 custody, transport him to your house and then have a trooper — 
16 A. Correct. 
17 Q. — come do that? 
18 A. Correct. Well, there's also the issue of liability with 
19 Fautin driving his vehicle and such so — 
20 Q. Well, he could have driven your vehicle. 
21 A. I guess that's true but then I have liability driving 
22 his vehicle so — 
23 Q. And prior to taking him into cust — or prior to taking 
2 4 him in your truck into custody you could have performed field 
25 sobriety tests, correct? 
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1 A. Well, yeah, I guess I could but — 
2 Q. (Inaudible). 
3 A. — in this fashion I'm — okay that's fine. 
4 Q. And based on that statement he was not free to leave, 
5 corret? 
6 A. No, he was detained. 
7 Q. And he also knew who you were, that you were a police 
8 officer, correct, you identified yourself? 
9 A. He knew me. I do not — I do not know him but he knew 
10 me and he knew where I lived so — 
11 Q. Knew that you were a police officer though? 
12 A. I believe so. 
13 Q. (Inaudible). 
14 A. Yeah. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. Yeah, and I don't think I ever told him that I was a 
17 police officer. I think that was just an assumption, and he knew 
18 who I was. 
19 Q. Right. 
20 A. So — 
21 Q. And it's a small community. 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. People know who (inaudible) . 
24 A. People know — a lot more people know me than I know 
25 them. 
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1 Q. Okay, and it was your purpose to take him with you to 
2 your house to have those tests performed, correct? 
3 A. The purpose, correct, cause I -- I didn't -- if I did 
4 the field sobriety tests then that would have been my arrest 
5 and such. 
6 Q. And with the statement that he was not going to leave 
7 until a trooper looked at him, you believed he knew that he was 
8 being detained or in your custody, correct? 
9 A. Yeah, I believe that he knew he was being detained for 
10 that purpose. 
11 MR. CARD: No further questions. 
12 THE COURT: Anything else Mr. Eldridge? 
13 MR. ELDRIDGE: Just a couple questions. 
1 4 RE-DIRECT EXAMAINATION 
1 5 BY MR. ELDRIDGE: 
16 Q. Did a — was Mr. Worwood cooperative with you? 
17 A. Very cooperative — 
18 Q. Did he ever — 
19 A. — very decent. 
2 0 Q. — ever indicate that he didn't want to go with you? 
21 A. No, never indicated that he didn't want to go with me. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 MR. ELDRIDGE: I think that's all, your Honor. 
2 4 THE COURT: Anything else Mr. Card? 




































COURT: You may step down. 
WITNESS: Thank you. 
COURT: 
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Mr. Card, do 
No, your Honor. 
I see 
desire 
that Mr. Card 








to submit a responsive memorandum? 






Wright had to 
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ELDRIDGE: (Inaudible). 
COURT 
you want a 








Two weeks? Okay. 
chance 
Honor. I just wasn't 
say so I wanted to see 
you need to do 
Once 
to submit a reply 
Yes, your Honor, I would 
Okay. 
I also 
lort written i 
COURT Okay. 
hadn't heard 




or do you just want 
like a chance to 
all of the testimony. We 
would like to 




MR. CARD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: And then file a notice to submit and the 
Court will make a decision on it. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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